Princeton Numbers Cruncher Confirms Anti-Woman Bias in Theater
Many thanks to Philip for his thoughtful reporting.
Princeton Numbers Cruncher Confirms Anti-Woman Bias in Theater
Many thanks to Philip for his thoughtful reporting.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Media Coverage
Tagged: Emily Glassberg Sands, gender bias, Playwrights
The full body of my thesis is available on the New York Times website. Please be patient, as the 170 pages take a moment to load.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Labor Econ
Tagged: Emily Glassberg Sands, Gender Discrimination, Labor Economics, Playwrights, Theater
Patricia Cohen wrote the following thoughtful article: Rethinking Gender Bias in Theater.
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Tagged: Emily Glassberg Sands, gender bias, Playwrights
This is an excellent summary of the evening at 59E59 and that evening’s implications, penned by an engaged audience member.
Here’s another, from Amy’s Script Vault, entitled “Should it be “Ernest’s Script Vault instead of Amy’s?” (Love that title, by the way! Thank you to Bertrand and Mullainathan for their “Are Greg and Emily More Hireable than Lakisha and Jamal”)
A couple days later, another audience member blogged for the New York Post.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Labor Econ
… I presented my thesis research and findings at 59E59 Theaters in NY.
The event was attended by a delightfully quick and open-minded audience comprised largely of members of the theater community.
I will post the video of the evening as soon as it comes into my hands.
In the meantime, I’ve included my slides here: Opening the curtain on playwright gender_ Sands_ June 22
A heartfelt thanks to all who attended and, especially, to all who made the evening possible.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Labor Econ
Tagged: Gender Discrimination, Labor Economics, Playwrights
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Everything BUT Econ

From my Pyne dorm room I distinctly hear the festivities known as Princeton Reunions picking up. Since I am conveniently located in the middle of the 5th, the doors of my building — and of my bathroom — have been unlocked. It’s sure to be a mess, but a fun one. Welcome to three full days of free beer!
How does the University justify subsidizing all that beer anyway?
In economics, a classic case for subsidies is positive externalities. When the marginal social benefit of a good — say, beer consumption — exceeds the marginal private benefit of that good, Pareto optimality can be achieved by subsidizing each unit of the good in the amount between the marginal private benefit and the marginal social benefit at the optimum quantity (i.e. the quantity at which marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost).
But what are the social benefits of beer above and beyond the private benefits?
A Princeton professor of mine once suggested camaraderie as a positive externality of beer. That’s certainly a possibility.
Another possibility, which falls more or less the same vein, but is somewhat more amusing to consider: loose men and women. You’d be surprised who looks OK — hot even — when you’ve a couple too many beers in you. That douche-bag riding on his mommy’s shirt-tails may even strike you as appealing if you’ve strong enough beer goggles on.
And who knows, maybe the douche-bag will turn out to be a good guy the next morning. Coffee from the Wa? Yes please! I’m convinced that’s what the University is hoping for. It seems the mission of Princeton Reunions is only a very slight modification of the official mission of Taglit Birthright.
Q: What is (Princeton Reunions)
A: (Princeton Reunions) founders created this program to send tens of thousands of (Princetonians) from all over the world to (Princeton) as a gift in order to diminish the growing division between (Princeton) and (Princetonian) communities around the world; to strengthen the sense of solidarity between (Princeton) and (Princetonians) throughout the world; and to promote the idea of a trip to (Princeton) for all (Princetonians) as a critical part of (Princetonian) life outside of (Princeton).
Like Taglit Birthright, Princeton Reunions unite many of their respective participants in coupledom. Rumor has it that if you marry someone you meet on the Birthright trip, Taglit will give the two of you a free honeymoon… in Israel. On campus, meanwhile, we’ve all heard the stats: 2/3 of Princetonians marry fellow Princetonians — and most of those couples get together at reunions.
This year, some attempts at creating connections appear to be a bit more overt. Take, for example, the Singles Mingle, which begins at 8:30 pm tomorrow in the beautiful Chancellor Green. Here, “all single alumni are invited to . . . come meet other single alumni and make new connections.” A little surprising that the event is sponsored by the Class of 1979. Maybe it should read, “Newly-Divorced Singles Mingle”?
But all you shy (or lazy) singletons out there, rest assured. Even if you don’t have the energy to mingle at the singles event in Chancellor Green, you — and everyone else on campus — will be benefiting this weekend from one of the positive externalities of beer. After all, our University is wise enough to correct for the positive externality by issuing a full subsidy. So, expect a campus full of “liberated” men and women. Sorry Mom, you aren’t the only one to have experienced the culture of the 60s.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Cosmo Econ
A delightful explanation of one kind of love — in differential equations–, courtesy of yesterday’s NYT:
“Romeo’s behavior was modeled by the differential equation dR/dt = aJ. This equation describes how Romeo’s love (represented by R) changes in the next instant (represented by dt). The amount of change (dR) is just a multiple (a) of Juliet’s current love (J) for him. This equation idealizes what we already know – that Romeo’s love goes up when Juliet loves him – by assuming something much stronger. It says that Romeo’s love increases in direct linear proportion to how much Juliet loves him. This assumption of linearity is not emotionally realistic, but it makes the subsequent analysis much easier. Juliet’s behavior, on the other hand, was modeled by the equation dJ/dt = -bR. The negative sign in front of the constant b reflects her tendency to cool off when Romeo is hot for her. Given these equations and an assumption about how the lovers felt about each other initially (R and J at time t = 0), one can use calculus to inch R and J forward, instant by instant. In this way, we can figure out how much Romeo and Juliet love (or hate) each other at any future time. For this elementary model, the equations should be familiar to students of math and physics: Romeo and Juliet behave like simple harmonic oscillators.”
That’s beautiful.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Cosmo Econ
Assume risk neutrality, and poker is a zero-sum game among players. Assume risk aversion, and it fast becomes negative-sum.
Any wealth creation from the game, then, must arise from complementary goods.
In the case of live poker, complementary goods include casino hotels, bars, restaurants, and shops. Vegas, where my poker-playing superstar of a brother (David Sands, currently ranked # 1 worldwide) largely lives and works, has made plenty off the game.
When it comes to online poker, a primary complementary good through which wealth creation arises is, advertising aside, the financial institutions through which the monetary transactions run. In the good ‘ole days, taxes on the wealth created by the financial institutions processing the monetary transactions provided revenue streams for the U.S. government as well.
Then, in 2006, Congress passed a law banning U.S. banks and other financial institutions from processing online gambling transactions. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, as it’s called, failed to reduce the volume of online gambling dramatically. It did, however, shift financial transactions from American to foreign shores, thereby stripping the U.S. government of the previously accrued tax revenues.
Although the Christian Coalition of America and the National Football League continue to support the 2006 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, the tide may to be shifting in Washington. After all, with his myriad stimulus packages Obama and his crew are in need of revenues if they hope to keep the government budget deficit under control. (On a far more personal note, the current president boasted of his own poker skills during his campaign.)
Enter Representative Barney Frank (Dem., Mass.), who introduced new legislation late last month which could overturn the 2006 Act. Perhaps the best reason to support Representative Frank’s proposal? A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that the legalization and subsequent taxation of online gambling would boost U.S. government revenues by over $50 billion in the coming decade. In these trying time, our country could certainly put $50 billion to good use.
→ Leave a CommentCategories: This&That Econ
Tagged: David Sands, Poker
The optimal size of a subsidy for ACT anti-malarials subsidy has been discussed extensively. The subsidy’s optimal form, however, has been less thoroughly analyzed.
The subsidy could be a fixed-dollar subsidy (e.g. subsidize each dose of CT $1)
Pro: The subsidy would be spread across the maximum number of doses. There would be competition among the producers of the CTs , keeping prices near competitive equilibrium; the subsidy would not be a windfall for drug companies.
Con: Note that “the use of two ACTs was more effective and averted more deaths than the use of a single ACT at the same subsidy level” (Laxminarayan, 2006). A fixed-dollar subsidy would not equalize prices across CTs. The least expensive CT would thus be used in greater quantity; this would, in turn, place greater selection pressure for parasites to become resistant to that combination, resulting in increased resistance to the least expensive CT and suboptimal per-dose effectiveness. ACTs are most effective if at least two CTs (i.e. at least two sets of two therapies) are used in conjunction as use of multiple CTs delays resistance to any one therapy.
President Clinton recently (July 2007) launched a pilot ACT subsidy program in Tanzania. His program makes a single ACT — a combination of artemether and lumefantrine — available to a national drug wholesaler at 10% of the current market price. This pilot subsidy program would not be directly applicable on a global scale, however, as it fails to incorporate a combination of ACTs and would thus result in a speedier evolution of resistance.
Alternatively, the subsidy could be a fixed-price subsidy (e.g. subsidize each dose of CT as necessary in order that the market price is $0.30 per dose)
Pro: Prices would be equalized across CTs facilitating equal consumption across CTs and resulting in minimal resistance to any one therapy. This would yield maximum per-dose effectiveness of each CT.
Con: A fixed-price subsidy would require negotiations between the subsidizer and the drug companies. Ideally, the subsidy would be the difference between the “competitive” price and the fixed-price. However, given imperfect price-signals, drug companies may reap additional profit from the subsidy. This would result in a suboptimal number of doses.
The optimal form of the subsidy, then, depends on the magnitudes of multiple variables, which are discussed in a document available via the following link: Optimal ACT Subsidy
→ Leave a CommentCategories: Health Econ
Tagged: Malaria